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himself believed or wished his audiencc to bclieve that Socrates managed 
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According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle's ethics, and 
ancient virtue ethics more generally, is fundamentally grounded in self- 
interest, and so in some sense egoistic. Most contemporary ethical theorists 
regard egoism as morally repellent, and so dismiss Aristotle's approach. 
But recent traditional interpreters have argued that Aristotle's egoism is 
not vulnerable to this criticism. Indeed, they claim that Aristotle's egoism 
actually accommodates morality. For, they say, Aristotle's view is that an 
agent's best interests are partially constituted by acting morally, so that the 
virtuous person sees morality as  essential to her happiness. (Call this 'the 
Constitutive Thesis'.) 
In this paper, I argue that the Constitutive Thesis is unpersuasive, both 
from a theoretical standpoint and (for similar reasons) as an interpretation 
of ~r is tot le . '  It is unpersuasive because it is much more demanding in both 
I would like to thank audiences at the 1999 ASAP conference, and at the 
University of Canterbury (especially Derek Brovme and Philip Catton). I am also 
indebted to Dougal Blyth and Tim Chappel1 for their very usefd witten 
comments, and to T.H. Irwin and Jennifer Whiting for helphl discussion of an 
earlier draft. 
' I do not consider all interpretations of Aristotle that have been, or might be 
offered. I~LImXable readings have been put forward over the years, and a survey 
of all of them is far beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I focus on the views of 
T.1 I. Invin and John McDowell. These are arguably the two m j o r  contemporary 
positions amongst those who believe that the question of self-interest makes sense, 
and is a live one, for Aristotlc. Of come,  another prominent set of interpreters 
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respccts than scvcral noncgoist altcrnativcs. My argument builds on an 
objcction originally offercd by John McDowell. McDoweIl claimcd (1) 
!!x! !k Pcc~s !~ ! !~~~vP Th qiq  reql~ires that thcre arc indcpendent standards 
of sclf-interest that can be agrced upon in advancc by all parties to thc dis- 
putc, both virtuous and nonvirtuous; and (2) that thcre arc no such 
standards. I argue that McDowell is mistaken. The orthodox position 
requires much lcss than McDowell claims if it makes an appeal to the dis- 
tinctivcness of the virtuous person's point of view. Howcver, unfortunately 
for traditionalists, thc price o f  this point of view defencc is high. First, to 
be even remotely plausible, the revised orthodox view must be almost 
frighteningly complex. Second, once this complexity is exposed, the 
orthodox view is much less plausible than its major rivals, in particular 
those which appeal directly to moral reasons. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Thc first explains the orthodox 
position and the Constitutive Thcsis. The second introduces McDowell's 
criticism and the point of view defence. The third section explains the 
costs o f  this reply. The fourth considers several ways o f  mccting these 
costs, finding each unsatisfactory. Finally, the fifth section considers two 
ways in which the orthodox position might be weakened in order to avoid 
some of the problems, but argues that both should be  rejectcd. 
I .  Egoism, inclusivism and altrusitic action 
Generally speaking, a position is egoistic if it subscribes to the claim 
that each person does or must or should do  whatever promotes some 
denies questions about the relative roles of self-interest and morality make sense 
for Aristotlc, usually because they take our concept of morality to have emerged 
only in the Modem period). Though this position is of considerable intcrest, i t  
does not fall within the scope of this paper. (The position is put forward by 
Anscombe, 'Modem Moral Philosophy', a seminal paper. See also Maclntyre, 
Aje r  L'irt~ie; and Williams, Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophl;). 
benefit for h e r s e ~ f . ~  But the particular form of  egoism of  interest here is a 
thesis about the rational justification o f  action:' namely, that each person 
ought to do  whatever promotes some benefit for herself because it 
promotes some benefit for herself:: Let us caii this view 'jusi;Gc;ai"ry 
Egoism'. According to Justificatory Egoism, an agent has a basic 
justificatory reason for acting in a given way if and only if acting in such a 
way promotes some benefit for that agent. 
Now, Justificatory Egoism conflicts with two facts about our moral ex- 
perience. First, it seems immensely plausible that in ordinary life good 
people sometimes perform altruistic actions: that is, actions which involve 
the sacrifice of their own interests, and which are genuinely done for the 
sake of others. Second, such behavior seems, at least at first glance, to be 
entirely reasonable. Given these facts, it seems unlikely that an egoistic ac- 
count o f  altruistic action can be correct. Furthermore, since the facts have a 
* For an excellent discussion of s o m  relcvant issues see Kraut, Arislolle. 
' This question is importantly different &om the question of what motivates an 
agent in acting virtuously. (For example, it would presumably be possible for an 
agent to perform the actions she would be rationally justified in performing but do 
them because they also happen to be most in her interest. Then her motivating 
reason for acting as she does would be different from her justifjlng reason.) These 
questions are closely connected on s o m  theories of ethics and moral psychology, 
and practically inseparable within those with a Humean flavour. But these are 
rnatters of great philosophical conkoversy h c h  will not be addressed here. I try 
to avoid the issue entirely in this paper, by presupposing nothing about the 
connection between justifjlng and motivating reasons. My assumption is that such 
a connection is something that must be specified and argucd for independently. 
(For the distinction between motivating and justifjlng reasons see Brink, Moral 
Realism, 42.) 
For examplc, egoism m y  be offcred as an empirical, conceptual, or normative 
theory of human behavior. (As an empirical or conceptual thesis, it is usually 
referred to as 'psychological egoism'; as a nomntive thesis, i t  is usually called 
'rational egoism'.) Various versions of each thesis have been attributed to the 
ancients. Thc thesis with which wc shall be primarily concerned is a kind of 
nomt ivc  thesis. 
high epistemic status, they create a general presumption against Justifi- 
catory Egoistn. This presumption constitutes a burden of proof that all 
versions o f  jusrir!catory Egcjisiii iiiiist ~dd icss ,  including eu:',"imcnis!ic 
versions. 
Traditional interpreters o f  Aristotle claim that Aristotle's cornmitrnent 
to eztdaimonia should be interpreted as  a comlnitment to a version o f  Justi- 
ficatory Egoism. On this view, Aristotle's appeal to eudaimonia is simply 
an appeal to what benefits an agent, and so to that agent's interests. Given 
this, Aristotle's essential claim is that an agent's being virtuous promotes 
that agent's interests. And it is the appeal to interests that explains 
eudaimonia's foundational role in Aristotelian virtue  ethic^.^ 
The general presumption against Justificatory Egoism has two 
implications for this account o f  Aristotle's e ~ d a i m o n i s m . ~  First, the 
presumption applies directly. If eudaimonism is egoistic, being morally 
virtuous is justified only if it promotes the agent's own interests. In other 
words, being just or generous, and being virtuous more generally, is ration- 
ally defensible only insofar as  having such character-traits contributes to 
the satisfaction o f  one's own interests. On this view, altruistic actions are 
justified only if they are authorized by virtues justified in this way. Hence, 
to be plausible as  an ethical theory, the orthodox interpretation must 
address the general presumption. Second, a related textual presumption 
applies when eudaimonism is attributed to Aristotle. For most 
commentators, including most orthodox interpreters, agree that there is 
strong textual evidence that Anstotle's moral virtues authorize altruistic 
For example, T.H. Irwin, a prominent orthodox interpreter, claims that 
Aristotle is committed to the view that 'the good that is realized in a happy life 
must be relative to the intercsts of the particular agent'. And by this, he seems to 
mean that Aristotle advocates the happy life because th~s  is the life that is in the 
agent's interests. See Irwin, 'Prudence'. 
"he presumption need not carry over if the ancients have a very different 
understanding of the moral virtues than we do, as some believe is the case. Still, 
most of the writcrs considered here do nor take this view. 
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actions. Hence, the orthodox interpretation must offer an account o f  
eudaimonism which explain how this can be so. 
The most popular way to deal with both presumptions is to offer a 
more detailed account o f  the connection between ~ e i C - i l ~ i ~ i i ~ i  i ~ d  ZC:II! 
virtue by endorsing a constitutive account o f  eudaimonia, and of the value 
o f  moral virtue. According to the constitutive account, Aristotle is an 
egoist of an especially sophisticated kind:' he argues that '[the] genuine 
moral virtues are parts o f  the agent's good, not merely causally effective 
instrumental means to itl."n this view, it is not the case that an agent 
should bc virtuous because this is the best way to secure some other good 
the agent values that is otherwise independent of virtue; rather, virtue is 
valuable to the agent for its own sake, as it is itself one  o f  the goods that 
the agent ought to seek to secure for herself. The virtues make a con- 
stitutive, not merely instrumental, contribution to the agent's overall good. 
Now, the introduction of this sophistication does not amount to a 
rejection o f  egoism. Instead, 'It implies only that [eudaimonists] require us 
to change our conception o f  what our interest consists in, not simply our 
view of  what will be  causally effective in securing our interest, as we 
previously understood it' (Irwin, 'Prudence', 286). The idea, then, is this. 
Aristotle does maintain that morality must ultimately be justified in terms 
of the agent's own interests. However, he also believes that the moral 
virtues are themselves constitutive parts of the agent's good, and so at least 
partly constitutive o f  her interests. Hence, the possession o f  the moral 
virtues, and the performance of whatever altruistic actions this entails, is to 
The textual debate centers on Aristotle's account of Friendship, in 
Nicornirc,hran Ethics Bk 9,  especially chs. 8-9. (Other relevant passages include 
1106a15-24; 114025-8.) In addition to i tem mention~d abovc, an extensive 
literature includes: Annas, 'Plato and Aristotle on Friendship', and 'Self-Love in 
Anstotle'; Kahn, 'Anstotle and Altruism'; Kraut, 'Comments on Annas'; and 
Invin, ..4i+colle j. First Principles. (In t h s  volume Adnane Rini's contribution also 
discusses friendship in Nicunrilclrean Ethics Bks 8-9. [Ed.]) 
Irwin, 'Pn~dcnce', 286. See also Ach l l ,  'Anstotle on Eudairnonia'. 
be justified in terms of an appropriately expanded understanding of the 
agent's interests. Let us call this position, 'Expanded Interests 
v..>-:---:--- 
t - u u a t 1 1 w L t I a I I t '  (E:Ej. 
2. McDowell's criticism 
In a seminal article, '7-he Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics', 
John McDowell claims that therc is a deep problem with the justificatory 
structure proposcd by the orthodox interpreters. Egoists are com~nitted to 
justifying the best life on the grounds that it is the most desirable in terms 
of self-interest. However, McDowell claims that, in disputes about which 
lifc is best, this will commit the defender of orthodoxy to saying that: 
The requisite idea of the most desirable lifc must involve canons of 
desirability acceptable to all parties in the disputes, and intelligible, in 
advance of adopting one of the disputed theses, to someone wondering 
what sort of life he should lead.' 
Hence McDowell claims that Expanded lnterests Eudaimonism depends on 
there being criteria for assessing whether a life is in a person's interest that 
are prior to, and independent of, a particular view about what constitutes 
'living as a good person w o ~ l d ' . ' ~  He goes on to claim that there are no 
such independent canons of desirability, so  that the orthodox view must 
fail. 
In order to resist McDowell's argument, the orthodox interpreter might 
deny that she needs any canons at all. However, this option is unattractive, 
for two reasons. First, it would frustrate the attempt to find a nonvacuous 
' McDowcll, 'Role ofEudaimonia'. 368 
l o  He also believes that the orthodox interpreter will claim (i) that such criteria 
will need to be constructed out of desires; and ( i i )  that this will be done by 
grounding those desires in an account of human nature that is similarly prior and 
independently identifiable. 
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theoretical grounding for the virtues. If there are no standards, one would 
have equal reason to call just any account o f  what one should (or does) d o  
'?nldential'." This is unattractive because it suggests that Aristotelian 
virtue ethies merely adds theoretical veneer to whatever set of moral 
claims one antecedently favoured, and so is intolerably conservative. 
Second, the claim that there are simply no standards or  canons to 
determine whether or  not a conception of the good life is really in our 
interests comes into serious conflict with our comlnonsense intuitions 
about self-interest. For surely there are at least some standards for the 
application of the term 'self-interest' to which any account of something 
recognizable as prudential must conform; and surely those standards 
exclude some possible views. 
These objections make it reasonable to rule out the 'no standards' 
view." A better strategy for the orthodox interpreter to employ against 
McDowell's eriticism would be to accept the need for standards o f  some 
kind, but argue that such standards do  exist and do justify the orthodox 
view. How might one defend this position? The first possibility would be  
simply to use commonsense standards of prudence to offer an argument for 
the virtuous life on egoistic grounds. There is something to be said for this 
strategy. (For example, Brad Hooker has recently argued that an agent 
does seem to have reason based on his own good to be virtuous because 
being virtuous counts as some kind of positive achievement.") Never- 
theless, overall it seems unlikely to work. First, reasons thus identified are 
I '  Standards or canons are not the only possible rational groundings. For 
example, one might also appeal to pa rad im,  exemplars or prototypes. (l thank 
Derek Browne for this point.) I assum here that McDowell intends 'standards' in 
a broad sense, to include other possibilities of this sort. 
' *  It is perhaps worth making clear that the need for standards does not mle out 
desire-satisfaction view of the good life. For example, someone who says that the 
good life for a person is the life in which her actual desires are satisfied is offering 
a standard. 
l 3  Hooker, 'Moral Virtue'. See also Sumncr, 'Is Virtue its Own Reward?'. 
unlikely to have the status that we normally associate with moral  reason^.'^ 
Sccond, the idca that moral virtue is an achievement presumably comes 
s ~ m p l y  from our comrnonsensc attitudes about the worth of  virtue. Eur 
these attitudes are usually called into question by egoists, who tend to 
regard them as deeply mysterious. Hence, it is unlikely to be enough for an 
egoist to rest her defense of  moral virtue on these grounds. hlore needs to 
be said (as Socrates finds out in the Republic). 
A more promising stratcby for the orthodox interpreter is to attempt to 
take the sting out o f  McDowell's requirement by rejecting McDowell's 
characterization of  the kind of  standards required, and arguing for a more 
moderate version. This strategy is promising because McDowell's require- 
ment does indced seem too extreme. In particular, it is not clear why the 
orthodox interpreter must accept canons of  desirability that are 
independent in the strong sense that MeDowell demands. hlcDowell 
demands that the canons are ( I )  acceptable to all parties in the dispute; and 
(2) intelligible in advance o f  adopting one o f  the disputed theses to some- 
one wondering what sort of  life she should lead. But these demands seem 
too strong, for two reasons. 
First, the claim that thc canons need to be acceptable to all parties is 
ambiguous. On the most reasonable interpretation, i t  means only that the 
canons are ultimately acccptable. Unfortunately, not much follows from 
this. It seems to require at most only that the canons are true or rationally 
favored in some sense, so that all parties will in principle be able to accept 
them. But this does not entail that the canons can be recognized as true 
from just any perspective. In particular, since acceptability may be a func- 
tion of  existing bcliefs, and so dependent to some extent on a pcrson's 
perspective. some people may have false beliefs which prevent them from 
endorsing the correct canons. 
1 4  There are several worries here. llooker ('Moral Virtue') is primarily 
concerned with the relative importance of moral reasons ris-(1-vis other reasons; 
Sumner ('Is Virtue its Oun Reward?') considers whether the positive contribution 
ofvirtue to selflinterest would be merely contingenr. 
I A RISTOTLE AND EGOISM / I Second, similar reasons cast doubt on the need for advance intel- ! ligibility from all perspectives. Since intelligibility is a function of  existing 
L^I:,Cn 
,., 2-c! rn d~p~nr l rn t  to some extent on a person's perspective, some 
people may have false beliefs which prevent them even from under- 
standing the correct canons. 
These problems for McDowell's requirements suggest that the 
orthodox interpreter should claim that it is possible to recognize the 
correctness of the appropriate canons of prudence from the unique, 
particularly-favored perspective of the virtuous person, but not from the 
perspective of the nonvirtuous person. The idea would be that the virtuous 
person has a privileged conception of self-interest and that this conception 
fully justifies her virtue, but that either the conception itself, or the 
justification, o r  both, are available to her only after her conception of her 
interests has been transformed by rational reflection.15 The nonvirtuous 
person, lacking this transformation in her perspective, and so the 
appropriate canons, would be unable to recognize that the canons are true. 
Call this 'the Point of View Defence' (PVD). 
The Point of  View Defence has several advantages for the orthodox 
view. First, it fits well with Expanded Interests Eudaimonism. For on that 
view, of course, the agent's understanding of  her own interests changes as 
she becomes virtuous. All that the Point of View Defence needs to add is 
the claim that it changes so much as to become partially or wholly 
unrecognizable as such to the nonvirtuous person. Second, i t  fits well with, 
and goes some way towards accommodating, the emphasis placed by 
eudaimonists on the transformation undergone by the nonvirtuous person's 
point of view when she becomes v i r t u o u ~ . ' ~  For the Point of View Defence 
claims that the virtuous person's (correct) account of prudence is so 
l 5  One will m n t  to refine this claim to accommodate thc fact that for Anstotle 
the continent and incontinent people also have s o m ,  albeit imperfect, pasp  of 
right action. But I l a v e  these sophistications aside here. 
I6 This characteristic of ancient cudaimonism is emphasized by Julia Annas as a 
criticism of the traditional view in Annas, 'Prudence and Morality'. 
.- - . 
transformed that i t  need not even be fully recognizable as an account of 
prudence to the nonvirtuous person. 
3. Challenging thc  point of  view dcfcnce 
Still, the Point of  View Defence is not the end of the story. Though it 
makes it easier for the orthodox interpreter to resist McDowell's criticisms, 
it makes i t  harder both to defend Expanded lnterests Eudaimonism as a 
philosophical position, and to show that it is really Aristotle's position. 
The basic point is the same in both cases. EIE offers an egoistic justifica- 
tion of  virtue. But to be persuasive, either in theory or as  a historical inter- 
pretation, the proponent of  EIE must do more than simply clainl that the 
virtuous person has a transformed and expanded conception of  self-interest 
which justifies her conception of the good life. I t  must show that this is in 
fact the case. And this, we shall sce in a moment, is no easy task. 
The basic point can be made more vivid by identifjing a contrast 
position. Expanded Interests Eudaimonism must distinguish itself from a 
nonegoistic alternative which has many of  the same features. In particular, 
it must distinguish itself from any alternative which claims that because the 
commonsense conccption of  one's interests is transfonned in light of 
virtue, the demands o f  expanded interests and moral virtue are 
extensionally coincident. For such an alternative will maintain that the 
virtuous person has a distinctive point of view, and that this transforms her 
conception of her interests, but deny that the virtuous person's life is thus 
to be justified on self-interested grounds. This raises a theoretical 
challenge to contcmpory proponents of  EIE. But the theoretical challenge 
also has a historical corollary. For two of the major competitors to the 
orthodox intcrpretation do take positions of roughly this kind. McDowell's 
Aristotle asserts that moral virtue and enlightened self-interest are 
coextensive in their demands, whilst Richard Kraut claims that Aristotle 
believes at least 'that one should always promote one's good lo some 
I r ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM extent'." Both maintain that the virtuous person has a distinctive point o f  1 view and that this transforms her conception of  her interests, but deny that 
her life is thus to be justified purely on self-interested grounds. In light of  
these rival views, it is vital that EIE defend its centrai jusrirrlcaiu~~ l a i i i i .  
Exactly what claims must Expanded Interests Eudaimonism defend in 
order to flesh out its distinctive position? The claims fall into roughly four 
groups. EIE requires (A) that there is something that counts a s  the agent's 
expanded interests; (B) that the agent's expanded interests are realized in a 
morally virtuous life; (C) that they can in some sense be recognizable as  
the agent's interests for reasons to some extent independent o f  the 
particular moral claims that the virtuous person aceepts;l%nd (D) that they 
are in fact what justifies the particular moral elaims.19 I 
More precisely, we can fill out those groups as  follows: 
" See Kraut, Aristotie, 84; italics in original. 
l 8  By 'moral claim' here, 1 mean only moral propositions or theses, v i ew about 
moral issues. Moreover the sense of independence at stake need not be so strong as 
that the reasons must nuke no reference to the moral elaim. All that is required is 
that the reasons musr nor be exha~rsted, norfiri1.v consrirutrd, by the moral claim. 
The rationale for this is that the egoist account must be able to distinguish itself 
from a nonegoist alternative which accepts that the virtuous agent can recognize 
and act on the particular moral claim on which the Point of View Defence 
depends, but denies that the egoist's elaim about expanded interests are true. 
l 9  This point suggests a way in which MeDowell's original criticism was not 
strong enough: even if the orthodox interpreter does endorse some set of mutually 
acceptable canons intelligible in advance, these need not be identical with the 
canons that justify the virtuous person's life to the virtuous person. For example, it 
might turn out that even the agent's commonsense conception of her own interests 
is best realized by being virtuous. In that case, m n y  nonvlrtuous people will be 
attracted to virtue for that reason. But that does not show that it is t h ~ s  fact about 
the wrtuous life that justifies it to the virtuous person. 
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( A )  Expanded interests (B) Virtue 
(EIE I) There is something that counts as the expanded conception of 
I ~ P  ~ g ~ n t ' l :  i n t ~ r ~ ~ t ~  
(EIE2) The expanded conception o f  the agent's interests is in 
principle recognizableZo as a conception o f  the agent's 
interests. 
(EIE3) The agent's expanded interests are such that it makes sense to 
talk o f  better and worse satisfaction of them. 
(EIE4) The expanded conception o f  the agent's interests is in 
principle recognizable as  the conception of her interests which 
the agent should endorse. 
20 The phrase 'in principle recognizable' deserves some comment. For Expanded 
Interests Eudaimonism in general, i t  refers simply to some suitable epistemic 
position. But the Point of View Defence singles out the virtuous person's position 
as epistemically privileged, and so suggests that the virtuous person herself plays 
this role. 
A more complicated possibility might be defended by an indirect egoist. I t  might 
be argued that the virtuous person is epistemically privileged only in recognizing 
the moral claims. not in recognizing either the expandcd conception of her 
Interests or its justificatory role (or both). Such views seem in conflict with the 
spirit of the PVD, since some hrther privileged epistemic standpoint must be 
posited. They also seem to conflict with Aristotle's demand that the virtuous 
person do the virtuous action for the right reason. Hence, I would be inclined to 
strengthen the episternic requirements by stipulating: (1) that the virtuous person 
be able to recognize the pertinent fact: (2) that she does actually recognize thrs 
fact; and (3) that it is this fact and her recognition of it that ultimately explains her 
choice of the virtuous life. However, I leave such considerations aside here to 
allow for the possibility of an indirect egoist eudaimonism. (On this kind of view, 
see Gottlieb, 'Aristotle's Ethical Egoism'.) 
(EIES) The agent's expanded interests are realized in a morally 
virtuous life. 
(EIE6) The agent's expanded interests are realized only in a morally 
virtuous life. 
(C) Independence 
(EIE7) The expanded conception of the agent's interests is in 
principle recognizable as a conception of her interests for 
reasons not exhausted by the particular moral claims that the 
virtuous person accepts. 
(EIER) The expanded conception of the agent's interests is in 
principle recognizable as the conception of her interests that 
the agent should endorse for reasons not exhausted by the 
particular moral claims that the virtuous person accepts. 
(D)  Jirst1j7cntion 
(EIE9) The expandcd conception of the agent's interests justifies the 
set of moral claims that the virtuous person accepts. 
(EIE 10) The fact that the expanded conception o f  the agent's interests 21 
justifies these moral claims is ultimately thc primary reason 
that the virtuous person's life is more choiceworthy than any 
other. 
The most important observations to made about this list are as  follows 
2 '  By 'the prirrnry reason', I mean that i t  is a decisive consideration in favor of 
that life. (There rrny be other reasons why the virtuous person's life is nmre 
choiceworthy, but these would not be sufficient either individually or collectively 
to make that life more choiceworthy in general.) 
First, the main point of producing the list (which may not be 
exhaustive) is simply to show that there are a significant number of  claims 
on i t .  manv of which are not even vaguely trivial Hence, the fnrt t h a t  !hey 
are essential to the revised orthodox view suggests that showing that view 
to be correct will be a considerable, and perhaps overwhelming, task. 
Second, since some nonegoistic versions of eudaimonism are in a position 
to make almost all of these claims-at least (EIE1)-(EIE8), and perhaps 
even (EIE9)-there is particular pressure on the orthodox interpreter to 
make plausible the last, and main, justificatory claim (EIEIO). This is the 
claim essential to justificatory egoism: namely, that it is the fact that the 
virtuous person's life (including the moral claims she acts on) is justified 
by her expanded interests that is the ultimate reason why the virtuous 
person's life is more choiceworthy than any other. 
Now, there is a way in which these points may, on reflection, seem ob- 
vious. After all, if correct, the list simply states the essence of Expanded 
Interests Eudaimonism in its more sophisticated form. Nevertheless, the 
list is important because it is not clear that orthodox interpreters have 
recognized the trouble i t  brings. Consider the following more specific 
points. 
First, Justificatory Egoism is not a completely plastic theory: it cannot 
be moulded to fit just any set of facts about moral life that one happcns to 
encounter. Instead, i t  has a certain internal integrity because the concepts 
that play a subsidiary role in it, such as 'interests', and 'prudence', have a 
certain internal integrity. In particular, since it is not the case that just 
anything could count as a person's interests, or in a person's interests, then 
i t  is not the case that just any set of practical prescriptions could be 
justified on egoist grounds. Nor would any self-respecting egoist want this 
fo be the case: this would render the doctrine vacuous and so unable to do 
the (justificatory) work i t  is intendcd to do. 
Second. given that one must preserve the internal integrity of  
Justificatory Egoism, i t  will not be enough to show merely that the virtuous 
person accepts a certain preference ordering for actions to bc performed, 
and that this ordering is rationally favored. Instead, i t  is essential to show 
that the ordering can be called apn~denrial ordering, and that i t  is favored 
I ARfSTOTLE AND EGOISM over other orderings because of its preferability on prudential grounds.22 The orthodox interpreter must show that expanded self-interest plays the essential justificaton/ role in Aristotle's theory in general, and in thc 
justification of altruistic action in particular. 
Third, for Expanded Interests Eudaimonism to justify altruistic action, 
expanded self-interest needs to be independent of the moral claims that 
need to be justified. This requirement becomes perspicuous when one 
remembers that EIE must offer a defense of altruistic action that is distinct 
from that offered by nonegoistic accounts. Nonegoist accounts typically 
claim that altruistic action is defensible simply because some moral claims 
are true and have appropriate weight. Hence, EIE cannot be reducible to 
the position that sorne rnoral claims arc true and have appropriate weight. 
Some reason must be given for thinking that it is in an agent's inrerest to 
recognize, endorse and act on these moral claims. 
Fourth, the independence requirement is especially important once the 
Point of View Defense is employed. According to the PVD, the agent 
needs already to accept the point of view of the virtuous person in order to 
endorse moral virtue. But for the reasons given above, the orthodox inter- 
preter cannot say that the role of the point of view of the virtuous person is 
simply to identi@ some moral claims as true and having appropriate 
weight. Instead, the PVD must forge an appropriate connection between 
the accepted moral claims and expanded self-interest. But the PVD faces 
an additional challenge on this point. For it must provide some reason for 
thinking that it is in an agent's interest to recognize, endorse and act on the 
moral claims that does not undermine the justificatory role of expanded 
'' For thc fact that the expandcd conception of her interests is the conception of 
her interests that the virtuous person accepts is not enough to show the superior 
desirability of the virtuous person's life. Since the vicious person also has a 
conception of her interests which (in some sense) justifies her life from her point 
of view, thc orthodox interpreter must defend the advisability of taking up the 
virtuous person's point of view. Hence, he must show that the virtuous person's 
expanded conception ofher interests is the conception to be favored. 
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self-interest. That is, there must be an appropriate gap between the epis- 
[entic role of the moral claims in generating expandcd self-interest, on the 
one hand. and the role of expanded self-interest inju.~/ifuin_p morality, on 
the other. For the justification of morality on self-interested grounds will 
be viciously circular if the moral claims go further than merely identifying 
cxpandcd sclf-interest and play too direct a rolc in justifying expanded 
self-interest. 
The task of bridging the gap between the epistemic role of the moral 
claims in generating expanded self-interest, and the rolc of expandcd self- 
interest in justifying morality looks daunting. In the next two sections, five 
strategies are considered. I argue that none are satisfactory. 
4. Five strategies 
The challenge for Expanded Interests Eudaimonism is keeping 
expanded self-interest and the moral claims close enough together to 
support the Point of View Defence, but far enough apart that the moral 
claims d o  not play too direct a role in justifying altruistic action. The 
orthodox interpreter will presumably argue that endorsing2' at least some 
moral claims is a necessary condition of  recognizing expanded self-interest 
because endorsing these moral claims improves an agent's epistemic 
situation by giving her access to a further prudential value. If this is so, we 
will want answers to three questions: 
I .  How does an agent come to cndorsc the initial moral claims? 
21 Why doesn't  just entertaining the moral claims give epistemic access? Why 
does one actually have to endorse them? Can't  one see without endorsing the 
claims that if they were true, they would reveal extra values and expanded self- 
interest? One  problem with this proposal is that i t  makes it unclear why the 
nonvirtuous person would be unable to entertain the claims, as the Point o f  View 
Defense requires. 
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2. How does the endorsement of these claims facilitate epistemic 
access to expanded self-interest? 
3. Eo-:; do:. :r.pzcded sf!f-interest itself endorse the moral claims 
and their role in a full conception of virtue through a change in the 
appropriate conception of self-interest? 
The five strategies emerge from considering these questions. 
Consider first the question of the initial endorsement of the moral 
claims. The First Strategy would be to claim that the moral claims come in 
via commonsense conceptions of self-interest. But this is implausible. 
First, it would seem to imply that the nonvirtuous person ought also to 
endorse the claims, and so to have access to the further prudential values 
and expanded self-interest. Second, as mentioned above, though there is a 
case for a weak justification of moral concern via commonsense 
conceptions of self-interest, an egoist will question the rationality of 
commonsense conceptions of self-interest in precisely this area. Hence, to 
include the moral claims on the basis of commonsense conceptions of self- 
interest would beg a crucial question. Third, even if the strategy were 
independently plausible, it would imply a reduced need for the Point of 
View Defence. For at least some moraI claims would already be acceptable 
on the grounds of commonsense conceptions of self-interest. 
If the orthodox interpreters reject the commonsense conceptions of 
self-interest as a basis for the initial moral claims, some other basis must 
be provided. The orthodox interpreter cannot appeal to expanded self- 
interest itself to generate the moral claims, as the moral 24 claims are 
supposed to provide epistemic access to it, not vice versa. Hence, there 
are hvo remaining possibilities (which become the Second and Third 
24 If the correct conception of expanded self-interest were already available, en- 
domd, and generating the moral claim, then the focus of the debate would be on 
justifying the enlarged conception, and the virtuous person's distinctive point of 
view, on nonmoral grounds. This is a possible w y  of defending one kind of 
egoistic eudaimonism, but does not fit well with the Constitutive Thais. 
Strategies). Unfortunately, both threaten to undercut the role of self- 
intercst. 
The Second S t r a t e 9  would be to appeal tn qnme third ronrmtjon of 
self-interest. But this would be a difficult position to defend, and in any 
case, an unreasonably complicated one. The Third Strategy would be to 
say that the moral claims must be accepted via some standard of 
endorsement other than self-interest. This creates two problems. First, if 
there are reasons to cndorse some nioral claims that arc independent of 
self-interest, it is not clear what role is left for expanded sclf-interest to 
play. Since thc original motivation for Expanded Interests Eudaimonism 
was to account for the independent appeal of virtues which make moral 
claims on us, much of its original appeal seems to disappear. Second, it is 
unclear what the new standard of endorsement will be. But the most 
plausible candidate is simply moral value itself. Unfortunately, this makes 
the strategy of EIE seem even more redundant. 
It is worth dwelling on the threat of redundancy for a moment? since 
this position may have some intuitive appeal to defenders of EIE. Consider 
the following objection. Surely, it might be said, the idea of the Point of 
View Defence is to say (a) that the virtuous person recognizes the impor- 
tance of  acting morally, (b) that in recognizing this the virtuous person 
becomes motivated to act morally, and (c) that this leads the virtuous 
person to see acting morally as in her interests. Hence, the independence of 
morality, far from making the Point of  View Defence redundant, is a nec- 
essary presupposition of the Point of View Defence. For the independence 
of morality is captured by (a) and, to a lesser extent, jb), and these are pre- 
supposed by the essential claini of the Point of View Defencc, (c). Why 
then is there a threat of redundancy? 
The threat of redundancy is created by the concessions, in (a) and (b), 
that some moral claims ought to be recognized and acted on simply 
because thcy arc true moral claims. For the claim that that there arc true 
moral claims which ought to be recognized and acted on simply because 
they are true moral claims is, in essence, simply the core claim of non- 
egoistic rivals to Expanded Interests Eudaimonism. The sophisticated ver- 
sion of EIE is, of  course, distinct from the nonegoist positions because it 
I ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM adds more to the core nonegoist claim. EIE asserts in addition that the agent's ultimate justification for actually acting on moral claims is that thev are endorsed by an expanded conception of self-interest that is 
revealed to the agent once she has endorsed some morai ciaims as true. 
Nevertheless, at this point, these extra claims render EIE less, rather than 
more attractive than the nonegoist alternative. On the one hand, the extra 
claims require considerable hrther defense. On the other hand, and this is 
the absolutely crucial point, there is little reason left for developing such a 
defence if the core nonegoist claim is accepted. For a nonegoistic position 
1 which claimed that the ultimate reason actually to act on the moral claims 
I is simply that they are true andshould be acted on would be a simpler and thereby more attractive position than this version of  EIE. Once the crucial 
claim is conceded, there seems no justificatory role left for expanded 
interests to play.25 
The Fourth Strategy is to claim that moral claims play a metaphysical 
role in generating expanded interests. Suppose we say that what makes 
moral virtue in our interest is that wc do cndorse the moral eIaims for the 
undisclosed independent reasons. Then, the mere fact of  our endorsement 
produces expanded self-interest. 
The advantage of this metaphysical interpretation is that it solves the 
immediate problem. We have independent values being endorsed, and so 
becoming part of expanded self-interest. Nevertheless, overall it is far from 
satisfactory. Consider four closely-connected problems. First, all the sub- 
stantive work is done by the admission that there are independent reasons 
to acccpt moral claims. In particular, i t  is the independent reasons which 
determine the content of morality. The metaphysical interpretation ensures 
the compatibility of morality with self-interest, but does not justify any 
particular set of rnoral claims rather than any other set. Indeed, the meta- 
physical interpretation suggests that claims that are endorsed have implic- 
ations for self-interest whatever their content, because it is the fact of their 
25 The possibility that the role of self-interest hcre is not justificatory (as rcquircd 
by EIE), but motivational is addressed below. 
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endorsement (not their content) than makes them in a person's interests. 
Second, the nletaphysical interpretation makes it hard to argue for taking 
2, 9f tho ,.;4 s , ~ , . ~  ..,.-"-..y~ --:-* -0 , . .  . 
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the virtuous life has a superior, or even secure, position with respect to 
other lives which endorse different moral claims. For all we know the 
virtuous life is merely one amongst many lives which come to embody ex- 
panded self-interest through the conferral of self-interest on certain en- 
dorsed aims. Third, the view is in any case implausible. The nletaphysical 
interpretation asserts that once the moral claims are accepted, they forni 
part of expanded self-interest. But why should we believe that it is the 
case? Why should we believe that endorsement automatically confers self- 
interested 
These points imply that even on the metaphysical interpretation, 
Expanded Interests Eudaimonism is less appealing than a nonegoist close 
alternative. For a nonegoistic explanation of the endorsement of moral 
claims, where it is the moral reasons themselves and their weight which 
provide a secure and superior status to moral virtue, is simpler and less 
mysterious than the metaphysical interpretation. 
The question of the initial endorsement of moral claims thus seems 
threatening to the plausibility of Expanded lnterests Eudaimonism. 
Nevertheless, this is not the end of the line for the orthodox view. For EIE 
may still play an important role in the lufer stages of moral development. 
Consider the following. The orthodox interpreter could claim that a person 
must accept only a few moral claims to gain epistemic access to expanded 
self-interest, and that the role played by these claims in morality as a whole 
is comparatively small. Perhaps endorsing the initial set of moral claims 
leaves out much that is important, or perhaps it leaves the initial moral 
claims in an inferior position with respect to other goods. For example, 
perhaps the initial set of moral claims is in danger of being crowded out by 
othcr goods, such as pleasure nor honour, which initially seem more 
26 One possibility would be to adopt McDowell's account of derived self- 
interest. But this is unlikely to be congenial to the orthodox project. 
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important. Then, the role of expanded self-interest is to complete morality, 
and give it the appropriate status. 
Thir po:sihi!i!y !?:inns nn the i s s ! ~  a h n ~ ~ t  how the moral claims play 
their designated epistemic role. How does endorsing or recognizing some 
moral claims provides epistemic access to more prudential facts, and so to 
expanded self-interest? First, one option, the Fifth Strategy, is to maintain 
that the role of the moral claims is purely the epistemic one of facilitating 
the identification of a further set of independent prudential facts. Hence, 
endorsing the moral claims has ramifications that change what we believe 
to be in our interests. Unfortunately, this purely epistemic role seems , 
extremely mysterious. Why should endorsing some moral claims lead us to 
I new views about self-interest? It is not enough for Expanded Interests 
Eudaimonism to assert that it does. Some explanation is required. Second, 
one such explanation is offered by contemporary desire- or preference- i 1 
based theories of well-being. These theories typically have a phase where 
the agent's actual desires or preferences are sanitized in some way, so that 
their content changes to reveal the agent's 'real' or 'reflective' desires or 
preferences. Unfortunately, the sanitation tends to be mainly formal. All 
that is done is to dispose of such things as inconsistencies, and errors in 
information. But this kind of change seems insufficient to be called 
'transformation', and in any case seems unlikely to produce a distinct and 
robust virtuous person's point of view. 
5. Two (partial) retreats 
In light of the problems raised above, the orthodox interpreter may be 
tempted to retreat a little. As it has been understood thus far, Expanded 
Interests Eudaimonism needs to claim: 
(1) Expanded self-interest justifies morality 
(2) Expanded self-interest is a version of self-interest 
(3) Expanded self-interest is the best conception of self-interest. 
But a weak version of EIE might give up one of these claims. 
One option would be to accept ( I )  and (2), but deny (3)." For example, 
suppose that there are internal and indcpcndent standards of self-interest 
iviiizh siipport [Lj .  1 hese may still may provlde e~ther  limited or no 
grounds on which to judge the relative merits of different conceptions of 
self-interest vis-a-vis one another, as better or worse. Perhaps all that can 
be said from the point of view of self-interest is (hat different conceptions 
are or are not conceptions of self-interest. or (more optimistically)'that 
thcre are a numbcr of conccptions of self-interest which fall within an 
acceptable range. In these scenarios, there need be no 'best' eonception of 
self-interest. Hence, i t  may turn out that commonsense self-interest does 
not support morality and altruistic action, whilst expanded self-interest 
does, but there is no reason based on self-intercst to choose between them. 
Nevertheless. the proponent of  EIE may well be able to accept this 
position. For it still asserts Justificatory Egoism insofar as i t  says that the 
virtuous life is justified by self-interest; and this is most of what's wanted. 
All that is missing is the ability decisively to defend the virtuous life on 
self-interest grounds against at least some alternatives. 
The problems for this position are twofold. First, there is the absence of 
external justification itself. This implies that the nonvirtuous person lacks a 
decisive reason to deveIop moral virtue, and perhaps that even the virtuous 
person lacks decisive reason to believe it a good thing that she is virtuous. 
Second, it makcs EIE even closer to some of its major rivals. For 
McDowell and others believe that external justification is impossible, or at 
least that Aristotle believcd this. But proponents of  the traditional view 
usually find this idea unsatisfactory, and in fact consider i t  a major 
motivation to pursue E I E . ~ "  
2 7 I n  a way, this option involves simply conceding the ob~ections made against 
the metaphy.sic:~l interpretat~on earlier, and so might naturally be married with tha t  
interpretation. 
18 Perhaps the proponent of EIE could say that there I S  reason lo prefer the life 
with expanded self-interest because there is a nonself-interested reason to choose 
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A second option for modifying the orthodox position would be to give 
up (a), the claim that it is expanded self-interest that justifies morality. This 
option may seem appealing to someone who accepts externalism about 
moral mot~vatlun; tile ciaim that the moiivaiiu~~al I'ulic c ~ f  iiifiia: cciisid- 
erations 29 depends on factors external to the moral considerations them- 
selves. For then perhaps the point of Aristotle's alleged appeal to ex- 
panded self-interest is not to justify morality, but to provide some motiva- 
tion for agents to act morally once such a justification is recognized. 
Unfortunately, this approach is also unattractive. Quite apart from the 
attractions of internalism about moral motivation and (arguably) of 
attributing such internalism to Aristotle, to give up the justificatory claim 
is to give up thc essence of Justificatory Egoism and so change the point of 
Expanded Interests Eudaimonism entirely. In addition, since (as mentioned 
earlier) some nonegoist versions of eudaimonism already recognize some 
extensional coincidence between the virtuous life and an agent's self- 
interest, even this version of the orthodox view will have to distinguish 
itself from its major rivals. 
between them What might this be? Perhaps one could argue that the reason is that 
morality is independently valuable and recognized as such, and the life of requires 
denying this. So one has a reason to choose expanded self-interest on grounds of 
rational coherence. This is an interesting possibility. Nevertheless, note how much 
of a justificatory role it concedes to morality itself, rather than to cgoism One 
must defend at least som moral claims on independent grounds, defend a 
connection between these and expanded self-interest, and defend the claim that the 
moral claim thcrrsclvcs give an agent a nonsclf-interest reason to prefer the 
virtuous life over nonvirtuous alternatives. But at this point one is accepting 
almost all of what would be required by a nonegoist alternative. 
29 This definition is draw from Brink, Moral Realism, 42. Brink attributes ex- 
ternalism to Irwln's interpretation of Aristotlc (and Plato) on the following page. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, even if the orthodox interpreter were to adopt the Point 
o f  View Defence against McDowell's claims about independent canons of 
desirability, a lot of work would still need to be done to show that Ex- 
panded Interests Eudaimonism works. Thus, McDowell's comments do, 
afler all, provide a foundation for shifting the burden o f  explanatory proof 
towards the orthodox interpreter. The key problems for EIE are in ex- 
plaining: ( I )  the generation of the moral claims that contribute to the 
virtuous person's distinctive point of view: ( 2 )  the role played by these 
claims in generating an  expanded conception of self-interest and justifying 
full virtue; and (3) the preferability of the expanded conception of self- 
interest over ordinary conceptions. On all o f  these points, EJE is less 
attractive than a simpler and less mysterious nonegoist position which 
claims that it is moral reasons themselves and their weight which provide a 
secure and superior status to moral virtue, and defends the virtuous life 
over the nonvirtuous life on these grounds. Hence. provided that they do  
not have similarly deep problems of their own,"' nonegoist versions of eu- 
daimonism are to be preferred to EIE. 
Sfephen Gardiner 
Un ive r s ip  of Canterbury 
'O Onc such problem would arise if the very idca of indcpendent moral claims 
were incoherent. (This position is taken by the third major school of contemporary 
Aristotelians and interpreters of Aristotle, inspired by Anscombe. I t  deserves to be 
laken seriously. However, as mentioned in a much earl~er footnote, I do not 
address this school of thought in this paper as the Constitutive Thesis shares with 
nonegoist views the assumption that the idea of independent moral claims does 
make sense.) 
Do we have duties to our friends? Nicomachean Ethics 
Buulis 8 aiid 3 
ADRIANE A. RINI 
Do duties and obligations arise out of friendship? Is it morally better to 
help a stranger than to help your friends? O r  is it, perhaps, the other way 
around? Aristotle, who devotes two books o f  the Nicomachean Ethics 
(hereafter N E )  to the subject of friendship, is generally understood to favor 
helping friends over strangers, and better friends over lesser friends. In this 
paper I show why this is too simplistic a reading of Aristotle. The 
connection between duty and friendship is an important issue in Aristotle's 
ethics since he discusses friendships often in terms o f  such things a s  fair 
exchanges, reciprocity, and expectations o f  'return'. But the precise nature 
of the connection between duty and friendship is not dealt with in detail in 
much of the recent literature.' Looking closely a t  NE Bks 8 and 9, I want 
ro consider when and what kinds of duties and obligations arise out of 
friendship as Aristotle conceives i t .  
Perhaps a good way to approach the issue is by considering various 
cases in which duties to friends might be said to arise. Consider the 
following: 
' In threc rccent book-length studics on Aristotle's notions of fncndship or moral 
responsibility, Price, Love ond Friendship; Meyer, hforol Responsibilip; and 
Stern-Gillet, Philosophy of Friendship, there is no explicit discussion of the 
connection between duty and friendship. This connection in fact appears to be 
ignored in much of the more general literature on the moral importance of 
friendship, as for instance, Blum, Friendship, Alrrrri.srn and hforalily. 
